A F T E R  T H E  W A R

Reconstructing the Balkans

Suggestions for the future, compiled from the REC report and Jernej Stritih, REC Executive Director


The REC report concluded that just because there are now no acute, short-term, large-scale effects (e.g. visible impacts on health) does not mean that there will be no long-term effects.

Major potential long-term environmental effects include high levels of pollution, threatened ecosystems (especially riverine), contaminated food and drinking water from soil and air pollution, environmental disturbances by refugees and radiation from depleted uranium.

The greatest chronic risk is to the water, now threatened by chemicals. The bio-accumulation and buildup of pollutants in rivers and groundwater resources (wells, springs and aquifers) is likely, particularly in the Danube reservoirs (Iron Gates).

The destruction of infrastructure (power/water supply systems, central heating stations and road/railway networks) in Yugoslavia could leave thousands without adequate power and water throughout the winter. Massive tree felling is expected, as happened during the war in Bosnia.

What's next?

The REC report is a snapshot that was prepared quickly due to the urgency of the situation. It is not a comprehensive assessment and data is missing. But the report is a useful reference for planning future activities in the areas of environmental monitoring, clean-up and remediation, reconstruction, environmental policy, institution building, support to civil society and environmental cooperation in the region.

Building on the REC report, a complete assessment of the environmental effects and potential longer-term impacts of the war should now be made focusing on Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro. Albania and Macedonia are seen as a second priority. The assessment should show current environmental 'hot spots' to enable priority setting for remedial actions to prevent long-term environment and health damage.

In Albania, FYR Macedonia and Romania, the report found that inadequate monitoring facilities and resources need to be improved to adequately prepare rehabilitation plans. No institutions in FYR Macedonia were able to precisely anticipate future risks. The Romanian monitoring system was seriously under-developed and despite the best work of staff, results are questionable. In Bulgaria, monitoring systems coped well with the challenges of the conflict.

Institutional and civil needs

Yugoslavia's environmental management authorities (ministries, inspectorates) and the wider environmental civil society (citizens groups or NGOs) were significantly weakened by the war. This incapacity is exacerbated by Yugoslavia's years of isolation and current lack of resources. It is expected that they will now be unable to adequately address current environmental problems or future aftershocks.

Rehabilitation can only be successful if sufficient environmental management capacity is established. This is the conclusion of the Paris-based OECD following their work related to the Environment for Europe process in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also a lesson from Bosnia in its post-war environmental efforts Ð that the involvement of local knowledge is crucial at both the governmental and civil level.

Too often, previous aid programmes have been rushed and unfocused, relying too heavily on foreign "expertise" rather than informed local specialists. If mishandled in this way, reconstruction could take place without the proper information and institutional memory required for good planning and remedial measures can become as much a threat as a solution.

Future reconstruction must take place with the support and full participation of relevant Yugoslav governmental institutions. Existing institutions need strengthening and a proper legal and political framework needs to be developed. In Albania, notwithstanding the good efforts of the Albanian government, there was poor cooperation between the emergency structures of central and local government and the responsible environmental institutions during the war. This needs improvement.

Environmental rehabilitation and long-term stabilization in the Balkans also requires the participation of civil society and the entire environmental NGO community, itself seriously affected by the war. The dynamic process of forming new organisations, which had been increasing in recent years, stopped. The programs of most existing NGOs were cancelled. Bombing prevented field activities and created shortages in subsidies, power supply and communications. Civil society must now be supported by transparent decision-making, open public participation and the international community. Without well-developed NGOs or citizen groups, the wider process of democratization of the whole society will slow down.

The strengthening and use of legal mechanisms such as the Aarhus Convention (see story) for the exercise of environmental rights must be supported. The REC's experience also shows that much can be achieved through trans-boundary cooperation by supporting joint activities between NGOs, governments and businesses. One example is cooperation between Albania, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia in nature conservation and eco-tourism that started with an NGO project to protect the Balkan Bear population.

Low priority

The environment will not be a top priority in the first months of reconstruction. Especially under time and political pressure to show quick results, institutions put environmental considerations aside. Short-circuiting of standard environmental procedures speeds up some activities but ultimately leads to negative environmental impact.

Significant benefits can be achieved if environmental concerns are integrated into the reconstruction strategy from the beginning. Environmental issues can provide the basis of cooperation among formerly antagonistic peoples to establish a new status quo. Using environmentally safe technologies may save significant clean-up costs later on.

Economic reconstruction activities should be carried out with a view to long-term sustainable development. Except for the most urgent emergency relief projects, Environmental Impact Assessments, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses should be conducted, as is usual for all EU and International Financial Institution (IFI) projects. Existing local capacity to conduct these activities should be developed.

Similarly, aid funds for environmental NGOs may move to the humanitarian NGO sector, especially in countries flooded by refugees, leaving a dearth of funds for environmental work. This should be considered.

Finally, the war may prove to eliminate an unsustainable system that prevailed in the Balkans. But if not replaced by a sustainable one, many will question the motivations of the international community.

More ideas

The Balkan reconstruction process should be integrated into the existing Environment for Europe process - a valuable tool for improving the environment while integrating it with the process of economic reconstruction. Tools include national and local environmental action plans, domestic funding mechanisms, economic instruments, policy tools for environmental integration, institutional capacity building and the promotion of environmental management in enterprises.

All Balkan countries, including Yugoslavia, intend to match their environmental standards with those of the EU - an opportunity for integrating Yugoslavia into a politically neutral pan-European process and the international community.

Finally, NATO countries should consider taking on much of the responsibility and liability for the environmental cleanup and rebuilding of infrastructure. They would prove that their intervention was not aimed at the general public in Yugoslavia and they could stimulate a fast transition to sustainable development.


REC * PUBLICATIONS * THE BULLETIN * SUMMER 1999

NEXT COVER PAGE HOME PAGE