COVER STORY
A F T E R  T H E  F L O O D

P O L A N D

Assessing the Polish flood

by Rafal Serafin

  In July, Poland's two great rivers, the Odra and Vistula, overflowed their banks causing flooding unprecedented in modern times. The floods showed the country to be ill-prepared for emergency planning, especially with regard to assuring protection of life and property, and later in dealing effectively with the post-flood reconstruction. Local governments, companies, environmental and other NGO groups, and citizens themselves were left to face the floods largely on their own - reminding those concerned with environmental security that not only must citizens and local communities be included in emergency planning, but that hazard response must be seen as part of a dynamic interaction between human activities and natural processes.

  Intensive rains were certainly the direct cause. Records from July 7 show that in Raciborz, Poland, for example, over 205 tonnes of rain fell over one square kilometer in a few hours. Over the next two days, water levels rose by 3 meters - 2 meters more than the previous maximum recorded. And flow rates reached twice the historical maximum.

  Yet attributing the disaster to unusual meteorological conditions is too simplistic. The causes lie much deeper, relating to a combination of factors including the destruction of forests and associated soil erosion in mountain areas - exacerbated since 1992 by: a new Forest Law which gave private landowners a free hand; engineering of mountain streams and rivers; the poor state of flood defenses due to years of neglect; bureaucratized flood control management; destruction of riverine wetlands and natural habitats; ineffective communication systems; and ineffective land use controls that permitted development in flood hazard areas.

  Over the past decade or more, all these factors contributed to a 'shortening' or 'straightening' of the Odra and Vistula thereby making them more susceptible to the hundred year flood. Experience from the Rhine shows that a 20 percent 'shortening' increases flood velocity by 50 percent.

Impacts and responses

  Since 1948, a Central Flood Prevention Committee, responsible to the Minister of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry, has had responsibility for all flood-related matters. In practice, this centralized command-and-control approach showed itself wholly inadequate in contending with the flood, compounded by the dominant conviction in Poland that flood protection can only be assured by engineering works - and which, hence, does not require active responses from citizens and local communities.

  The reality was that of communication chaos, jurisdictional conflicts between local and central government, and lack of coordination among police, fire services, civil defense and the army. By July 7, flooding was already extensive in southern Poland, yet the national government took until July 12 to begin reacting in any systematic way. Indeed, the Premier's initial response was that flood assistance was not the government's business as people should have insurance. The result was that communities fended for themselves as the Odra and Vistula surge moved downstream overflowing community after community.

  The flooding affected a quarter of the country - an area populated with 4.5 million people - including 86 towns and over 900 villages in 300 municipalities. The cities of Opole, Klodzko and Wroclaw were devastated. Nearly 653,000 hectares of agricultural land were affected, 30-50,000 homes and 50,000 farms destroyed, over 5,000 pigs and a million chickens lost, 170,000 telephone connections lost, 130,000 people evacuated and 52 people killed. Infrastructural damage included 140 bridges, 1,600 kilometers of roads, 11,000 kilometers of rail lines and 1,200 kilometers of dikes.

  Despite several assessments by central and local governments and the appointment by the Premier of a special Flood Commissar, damage estimates remain incomplete and funds for infrastructure repair are not being released in any systematic fashion, raising concerns over possible fall and spring floods.

  The State Environmental Protection Inspectorate assessed environmental damage in 241 sites in 18 "Voivodships" at the end of July, warning of serious environmental threats, especially with regard to land contamination - yet no information has been made available to affected communities in any systematic way. The implications of land contamination, the leaking of dozens of waste dumps, and thousands of hectares of agricultural and forest lands having been damaged by soil erosion are not being addressed, even though 56 sewage plants stopped functioning, as did 13 waste dumps including those in Wroclaw and Opole where waste management systems collapsed. In desperation, Wroclaw trucked its waste over 100 kilometers to Legnica.

Local responses and challenges

  It was citizens and communities who had to respond to the flood and later to undertake post-flood reconstruction efforts with local governments playing a vital role. New local leaders came forth and community action strengthened existing NGOs which were often the sole source of information and advice in the affected areas. Several environmental groups contributed, organized volunteers and provided advice and funds for emergency efforts and cleanup. Examples include the Karkonosze Foundation in Jelenia Gora, the Polish Ecological Club, Foundation for the Olawa and Nysa River in Wroclaw and Green Action in Legnica. The Polish Environmental Partnership responded by helping to keep NGO partners operational through material emergency, information and communication support and by directing them to the enormous wave of support from other parts of the country.

  For environmental organizations, the challenge for the future is to go beyond emergency response. Working with its counterpart in the Czech Republic, the Polish Environmental Partnership Foundation helped organize seminars in Olomouc in the Czech Republic and Jelenia Gora in Poland to plan future strategies. Work continues aimed at (1) ensuring environmental considerations and local community experiences are fully taken into account in the post-flood reconstruction; (2) identifying opportunities for innovative environmentally-oriented solutions to economic redevelopment problems, and (3) helping to build local response capacity by raising awareness and understanding of the nature of interactions between human activities and natural systems.

  In sum, the challenge is to propose alternatives to the centralized command-and-control approach, currently favored by government, to dealing with the flood and other natural hazards. By placing emphasis on approaches that engage local governments, communities and citizens, meeting this challenge will require a complete rethinking of current approaches to flood prevention and environmental security.

- Rafal Serafin, director
for the Polish Environmental Partnership Foundation,
e-mail: epce@kki.krakow.pl


REC * PUBLICATIONS * THE BULLETIN * SUMMER 1997

PREVIOUS NEXT COVER PAGE HOME PAGE